As it turns out, I care about 9/11.  On that day America lost 3,000 lives, two of the world’s most impressive buildings, an economy centered around debt and credit, and nearly all of her Civil Liberties.

Digging deeper through all the information regarding Building 7 (the third building that fell on 9/11), one can possibly conclude The 9/11 Commission Report does not add up to the events of that day.  Also, Larry Silverstein, the leaseholder for the World Trade Center admits Building 7 was taken down with controlled demolition.  The question I have is: How did they manage to squeeze weeks and weeks and weeks of work (planning and loading explosives into the perfect places in the building) down to just hours?

One may believe 9/11 is old news and focus should be elsewhere; that’s perfectly fine with me.  In my opinion, if there is a reinvestigation and there is something hidden from the people, 9/11 is a main focal-point of which the Patriot Act disappears, ALL the cameras are dismantled, the FBI and CIA are no longer able to collect biometric data, the FBI and CIA must halt installing iris scanning ability to track the citizens’ every move, TSA body scanners are sold for parts, and all of our troops are brought home.  Operation Defuse would not be in existence.

Everyone should care about 9/11, even to only care about a losing a single life, about the hard work put forth from our law enforcement and firemen, about a family losing a father, mother, or child.  History has shown the government and the people do not take action without a reason.  The people ended the Vietnam War after the release of the Pentagon Papers… What if 9/11 was controlled demolition?

Catherine

__________________________

For those of us in law enforcement, September 11 was one of those milestones. It changed all of us personally. It changed America. And it changed the way we go about protecting America.

If you Google the phrase “before September 11,” almost half a million results pop up. Thousands upon thousands of them center on the intelligence failures that contributed, in part, to the hijackers’ success.

The bottom line is that before September 11, we didn’t have the technology, the partnerships, or the information sharing we needed to prevent the attack. After September 11, our challenge was to improve all three.

Before September 11, we didn’t have the comprehensive intelligence capability we needed to prevent the attack—from collection, to analysis, to sharing, to action. After September 11, our challenge was to strengthen each element.

Before September 11, all of us were collecting the dots, and all of us were connecting the dots—but we were all doing it individually. After September 11, our challenge was approach intelligence as a team.

We have all risen to the challenge. Speaking just from the FBI’s perspective, I can say we are much more connected to our state and local partners today than we were before September 11. We built new databases—and we also increased connectivity to them. We formed new task forces—and worked to integrate our partners so they could fully participate on them.

But the most important change we made is one that all of us in law enforcement had to make—and that is changing our understanding of what intelligence is.

A question I frequently hear is, “What exactly constitutes intelligence? How can you define it?” Simply put, it is information: vital information about those who want to harm us. But as you know, nothing is ever that simple. There is a world of difference between information and knowledge.

The problem we face is not a lack of information, but rather a flood of it. It’s like trying to sip water from a firehose. Our job is to wade through a river of unrelated and often indecipherable data, and to determine what is important, and who needs to know it.

But how do we turn all that raw information into valuable knowledge? How do we turn a name, a phone number, or an ATM receipt into a comprehensive understanding of our threat environment? How do we transform it into actionable intelligence that helps us prevent a terrorist attack?

That’s where the fusion centers come in.

Inside fusion centers, information collected by a police officer on a beat can be merged with information from an ongoing FBI investigation several states away. For example, many of you have heard the Chesapeake Bay Bridge story. Back in 2004, local law enforcement officers in Maryland stopped a car after a woman was observed videotaping the structure of the bridge. Red flags went up when the officers ran the driver’s name through NCIC. They then called the fusion center, in this case, the Terrorist Screening Center. It turned out that the driver of the car was wanted in connection with a Chicago investigation involving Hamas.

Now, we won’t have a story like that every day. But fusion centers do much more than just provide timely intelligence. They allow us to see both the macro and the microview of our threat environment. We can’t win a battle without understanding our adversary, and knowing every inch of the battlefield.

via Federal Bureau of Investigation – Major Executive Speeches.

This afternoon at 3:30 EST, a House Homeland Security subcommittee will be holding hearings on the centers, but unfortunately they won’t be hearing from Jim Harper, a policy analyst for the libertarian Cato Institute, who just released an analysis of fusion centers’ promises and perils.

As established in the House bill, the FLEET grants would be conditional upon a number of requirements set by the Homeland Security Secretary such as eligibility requirements for law enforcement personnel detailed to the centers and hiring of personnel “representative of a broad cross-section of local and tribal law enforcement agencies and departments.”TheHomeland Security Secretary would have “general regulatory authority” to script, implement, and interpret the FLEET program and could revoke or suspend funding to a local fusion center at any time upon a determination that the fusion center “is not in substantial compliance.”

The Senate bill would create a more broad-based grant program which would give state governments money to fund fusion centers (as well as other activities). The director of the Federal Emergency Management Agency would have the ability to pull funds for failure to “substantially comply.” As in the House bill, these provisions would make the fusion centers dependent on the priorities of the Department of Homeland Security rather than the priorities of state and local law enforcement.

Placing fusion centers under the de facto direction of the Homeland Security Department would portend the creation of a new domestic intelligence agency along the lines of MI-5. The Senate bill would explicitly blend elements of criminal and terrorism intelligence, raising the prospect of state and local undercover agents working under the direction of DHS fusion-center liaisons. These operations would be outside the scope of traditional Justice Department guidelines on infiltrating domestic groups, leadingexpertssuch ACLU’s Tim Sparapani to worry, “we’re setting up essentially a domestic intelligence agency.” Without a guarantee that such written guidelines could be enforced, the slippery slope to spying on political dissidents — as the FBI’s COINTELPRO did before such guidelines — is inevitable.

The fusion center program also would seem to require massive amounts of one-way “data-sharing” from the state and local law-enforcement agencies to Homeland Security and the DNI, and not in the other direction. Sen. Dianne Feinstein (D-CA) reported at a recent Congressional hearing that fusion centers in California were having big trouble getting intelligence from the feds: “DHS has resisted allowing the state and local[sic]to get top security clearances for what the state believes are territorial reasons… Intelligence that the [fusion center] director knows exists doesn’t get sent to him. He’s spent a good deal of time trying to get someone to pass him intel instead of having it pushed away. DHS is generally overly protective and resistant to working cooperatively from what the director believes is a fear of becoming irrelevant.”

The full text isn’t currently available, but it’s issue 100 of Tech Knowledge. More fusion later, but I’d love to hear from any current fusers.

via Fusion Center Cash Infusion | Threat Level | Wired.com.

Fusion centers are where state, local, and federal officials work to share information that may have both law-enforcement and intelligence value—presumably while listening to early '70s Miles Davis albums. Though the concept predates the terror attacks of September 11, fusion centers have become far more popular in recent years, and in 2007, the 9/11 Commission Act established the State, Local and Regional Fusion Center Initiative within DHS, which now coordinates about 60 such facilities. Civil libertarians have long worried that fusion centers could become warehouses for reams of data about innocent persons.

Though this week's report provides precious little in terms of genuine assessment—most of its 42 pages are devoted to reviewing formal principles and guidelines rather than on-the-ground practices, and it leans heavily on a January Congressional Research Service report—the PIA does identify seven areas of concern DHS should work to address.

Pursuant to the terms of the 9/11 Act, the DHS fusion center initiative should be restricted to the collection of data relevant to national security investigations in order to prevent so-called “mission creep.” As the report notes, “many fusion centers have an 'all crimes and/or all-hazards' mission, which is substantially broader than the homeland security mission the Initiative supports.” The Privacy Office, however, “presumes that the States are interested in preserving and competent to protect the rights of their own citizens, and offers no opinion as to their methods.”

The report also expresses concern about “ambiguous lines of authority, rules and oversight,” noting that 10 percent of fusion centers indicated to the Government Accountability Office that they lacked adequate guidance on information storage and sharing practices. While privacy training for fusion center agents is meant to mitigate this problem, the report observes that “content is still being created for the privacy training requirements established under the 9/11 Commission Act for State and local fusion center representatives.”

Perhaps the most frequent worry about fusion centers concerns the use of information from private databases, in particular for the purpose of data mining—an investigative technique whose efficacy was questioned in a recent report by the National Academy of Sciences. The Privacy Office promises to conduct a data mining workshop in the near future, and to update its impact assessment as it gathers more information. In the interim, the report recommends increased transparency and the implementation of a redress procedure to permit individuals to correct inaccurate information about themselves held in fusion center databases.

via DHS report surveys fusion center privacy concerns.

Author:

Eben Kaplan

February 22, 2007

Introduction

In the early morning hours of September 9, 2001, a Maryland State Trooper made a routine traffic stop, pulling over a car headed north on I-95 and issuing a speeding ticket. Two days later, the driver of that car, Ziad Jarrah was one of four hijackers aboard United Airlines Flight 93 when it crashed in western Pennsylvania. The officer who issued the speeding ticket had no idea that Jarrah was on a CIA watch list. If he had, experts say it is possible he might have prevented, or at least disrupted, the worst terrorist attack in history.

About two years later, Maryland opened its Coordination and Analysis Center, an intelligence “fusion center” designed to pool and analyze information from federal, state, and local sources, in an effort to get vital information to the police officers who every day patrol the home front of the “war on terror.” Now in forty-two states plus the District of Columbia, fusion centers represent an important development in state-level homeland security initiatives. In some cases, police departments have even changed how they approach their work, emphasizing intelligence collection and sharing. Though experts applaud efforts to have better informed police officers, some civil libertarians worry about the collection and use of such information.

How Fusion Centers Work

Though fusion centers vary from state to state, most contain similar elements, including members of state law enforcement, public health, social services, public safety, and public works organizations. Increasingly, federal agencies such as the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), Federal Bureau of Investigation, Drug Enforcement Administration, and Bureau of Alcohol Tobacco and Firearms station representatives at state-level fusion centers.

State and federal representatives input into a fusion center's database a broad spectrum of information, including the location and capabilities of area hospitals, details from calls to the state's 911 emergency hotline, and names from federal terrorism watch lists. This data pool is then drawn on to form a clearer picture of threats facing each state. In addition, it helps inform police investigations, contingency planning, and emergency response.

“If we learn about a threat only when it becomes imminent, then it is too late.”

Experts say putting this information at the fingertips of local law enforcement—who are likelier than federal authorities to come across aspiring terrorists on U.S. soil—transforms police officers from first responders into “first preventers.” The idea is that the next time a would-be terrorist on a government watch list is pulled over for speeding, the officer at the scene will have the information he needs.

Placing federal representatives alongside local officials also helps to ensure more timely delivery of information. In the past, state and local authorities often received warnings only in times of immediate danger. As Cathy L. Lanier, Washington D.C.'s acting police chief, told a recent Senate hearing (PDF), “If we learn about a threat only when it becomes imminent, then it is too late.”

Federal Support

The rise of fusion centers, which accelerated greatly from 2004 to 2005, came about in part because the federal government placed much of the responsibility for homeland security on state governments. Many states view fusion centers as a necessary tool for meeting this charge. The U.S. government's response has been enthusiastic: “Fusion centers will be a key conduit for sharing federal information and intelligence down to the local level,” says DHS Chief Intelligence Officer Charles E. Allen.

To help states create intelligence hubs that function properly, DHS teamed with the Department of Justice to author a set of guidelines (PDF) for establishing and operating fusion centers. Since 2001, the federal government has provided some $380 million to help fund fusion centers that meet the guidelines, though in recent years only sixteen states received such assistance (PDF).

The federal government has even adopted the fusion-center model for its own purposes. The National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC), established in 2004, tracks the terrorist threat by pooling representatives from the various national intelligence agencies.

via Fusion Centers – Council on Foreign Relations.

The Mission of the Indiana Intelligence Fusion Center is to collect, analyze, and disseminate information and intelligence data regarding criminal and terrorist activity in the State of Indiana while following Fair Information Practices to ensure the rights and privacy of citizens.

Monte McKee, Executive Director

317.233.9461

Following the events of September 11, 2001, many local, state, and federal agencies initiated efforts to improve information sharing and intelligence gathering. Throughout the nation, numerous states developed new workgroups to develop these efforts. Indiana was among these states and in 2006 created the Indiana Intelligence Fusion Center (IIFC).

Indiana Intelligence Fusion Center Executive Committee

The IIFC, a division of the Indiana Department of Homeland Security, receives policy development, administrative guidance, and oversight from an Executive Committee. Committee membership includes representatives of local, state, and federal government.

* Adjutant General of Indiana

* Director of Law Enforcement for the Indiana Department of Natural Resources

* Executive Director of the Indiana Association of Chiefs of Police

* Executive Director of Indiana Department of Homeland Security

* Executive Director of the Indiana Sheriff’s Association

* Indianapolis Chief of Police

* Marion County Sheriff

* Special Agent In Charge of the Indianapolis FBI Field Office

* Superintendent of the Indiana State Police

* Superintendent of the Indiana Excise Police

* U.S. Attorneys for the Northern and Southern Districts of Indiana

* Indiana Gaming Commission – Division of Gaming Agents

* Indiana Department of Correction

* Indiana Campus Law Enforcement Administrators (INCLEA)

Additional Information

* Indiana Intelligence Fusion Center Brochure (view)

* Join the LEO SIG (Law Enforcement only) (view)

via IDHS: Indiana Intelligence Fusion Center.

Following the terrorist attacks on September 11th, multiple commissions and the Federal Government determined that one of the critical factors that led to the attacks was the inability of federal, state, local and other law enforcement activities to collect, analyze and disseminate intelligence information. It is widely accepted that the indicators were there but were not recognized or shared in a timely manner. . Our nation’s need to reorganize our intelligence capabilities has resulted in over 40 federally funded regional, state and local fusion centers across the country to act as our nation’s eyes and ears in the war against terror.

As of February 2009, there were 58 fusion centers around the country. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS), through the Office of Intelligence and Analysis, has deployed 31 intelligence officers as of December 2008 with plans to have 70 additional professionals deployed by the end of 2009. DHS has provided more than $327 million from FY 2004-2009 to state and local governments to support t fusion centers.

The goal of fusion centers is to prevent manmade threats and to respond to natural disasters as effectively and efficiently as possible. The ability to integrate multiple streams of intelligence, gathered not only from federal, state and local government agencies, but also the private sector and local citizenry, allows a more accurate and comprehensive picture of risks to people, infrastructures and our communities. The goal of this integrated approach to intelligence gathering is to synthesize the information and translate it into protective action.

There is no one “model” for fusion centers and how they should be structured and operated. There is little guidance or a nationwide consensus on the role of a fusion center in the war on terror or in the fight against crime. Consequently, fusion centers nationwide have varied priorities and roles from state and local law enforcement. These priorities and roles range from counter-narcotics, criminal intelligence and counterterrorism creating an all-crimes and all-hazards approach to intelligence analysis and fusion. A Congressional report stated that there is little “true fusion” or analysis of disparate data sources, identification of intelligence gaps or pro-active collection of intelligence against those gaps which could prevent protective action from being taken.

The 3rd Annual Fusion Center and Information Sharing Strategies Conference will bring together government officials, emergency responders, security personnel and the private sector to address the issues of fusion centers information sharing. Attendees will hear experts discuss the role of fusion centers and hear first hand from “model” fusion centers that have clear operational and technical capabilities. Speakers will provide insight into the functions, operations and the role of technology in the fusion center and how the three must be integrated for effective information sharing. Speakers will discuss best practices, new trends, tools, technologies, SARS, baseline capabilities, and processes that can help fusion center stakeholders improve information and intelligence sharing and collaboration across all levels of government and private industry.

What You Will Learn:

* Methods of integrating disparate intelligence information

* The effective use of career intelligence officers

* Strategies to consolidation selected fusion centers and the cost/benefit trade-offs

* Use of an all hazards approach vs. specific criminal activity

* Interpreting and applying existing Federal guidelines

* What are the Funding sources for fusion centers

* What are the Training and technology needs for fusion centers

* Analysis of civil liberties and privacy concerns

* Fusion center best practices

Who Should Attend:

* Federal, state and local security planners involved with fusion centers or information sharing

* Fusion center directors and analysts

* Services and product providers who wish to learn about federal programs, grants and funding for fusion centers

* Executive, senior, project management, and technical staff involved with fusion centers

* Homeland Security Officials

* First Responders

* Local, state, tribal, and federal law enforcement

via Homeland Defense Journal – 3rd Annual Fusion Center and Information Sharing Strategies Conference.

By Joseph Straw

04/21/2009 -

Members of the private task force that has helped guide post-9-11 information sharing efforts addressed lawmakers Tuesday, agreeing with civil libertarians that more must be done to protect privacy amid the effort to detect terrorist plots.

Zoë Baird, president of the nonprofit Markle Foundation and co-chair of its Task Force on National Security in the Information Age, told members of the Senate Judiciary Committee's Subcommittee on Terrorism and Homeland Security that the country’s new information sharing environment (ISE) cannot succeed without the public’s trust, which can only be gained through proper privacy protections.

Baird recommended establishment of a government-wide privacy policy to eliminate doubts and contradictions about what is and is not acceptable in the effort to discern which activities, taken together, might constitute a terrorist plot.

The hearing came on the heels of several revelations bolstering civil libertarians’ arguments that the ISE and its national network of intelligence fusion centers are fertile ground for abuse of civil liberties, such as unconstitutional police investigations of peaceful political and religious groups.

In one case, the Maryland State Police investigated several non-violent antiwar and human rights groups, filed them as terrorist organizations, and transferred the data to a federal law enforcement database.

Witness Caroline Fredrickson, director of the Washington office of the American Civil Liberties Union, told senators:

It would be an enormous mistake to ignore the lessons of past failure and abuse on a subject as critical as spying on the American people. We don’t have to choose between security and liberty. In order to be effective, intelligence activities need to be narrowly focused on real threats, tightly regulated and closely monitored.

Chief J. Thomas Manger of Maryland’s Montgomery County Police Department urged continued development of the national suspicious activity reporting (SAR) system, by which fusion centers map suspicious activity to “connect the dots” and detect elevated threats or plots themselves.

Manger, however, noted the potential pitfalls of SARs:

No police chief wants his officers involved in confrontational interactions with people engaged in innocent, constitutionally protected behavior. Not every person wearing baggy pants is a gang-banger and not every person videotaping the Washington Monument is a terrorist.

Instead, proper practice can thwart terrorist activity, Manger said, pointing to an incident in 1995:

Sgt. Robert Fromme from the Iredell County (North Carolina) Sheriff's Office saw two men enter a discount tobacco shop with over $20,000 cash in a plastic grocery bag. These men came into the shop almost daily buying many cartons of cigarettes. Fast-forward several years and the [Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives] and FBI indicted 26 individuals who were using proceeds from criminal activity to fund a terrorist group based in Lebanon. A suspicious activity noted by local law enforcement, appropriately documented and legally investigated, results in a terrorist operation being shut down.

via Fusion Center Dialogue Continues | Security Management.

No. 2 September 2007

State Fusion Center Processes and Procedures:

Best Practices and Recommendations

by John Rollins and Timothy Connors, Director, Center for Policing Terrorism

About the Authors

John Rollins is the lead author of this report. Mr. Rollins is a member of the Library of Congress’s Congressional Research Service (CRS), where he serves as a Specialist in Terrorism and International Crime. Prior to joining CRS, he was chief of staff in the Office of Intelligence for the Department of Homeland Security. Mr. Rollins’s career includes a variety of analytic, legal, and management positions in the U.S. Army, FBI, CIA, DIA, U.S. Marine Corps, Delta Force, and United Nations. He is a licensed attorney and a graduate of the Senior Executive Fellowship program at Harvard University. He also teaches national security courses at a number of universities. The analysis and opinion contained in this report are solely those of the authors and do not reflect the views of CRS.

Tim Connors is director of the Center for Policing Terrorism (CPT) at the Manhattan Institute. He is a graduate of West Point and holds MBA and JD degrees from the University of Notre Dame. Mr. Connors has helped law enforcement agencies across the country develop sound counterterrorism and intelligence policies and practices. He is a career Army officer who is currently assigned to a civil affairs unit in the Army Reserve.

Introduction

America’s radically decentralized law enforcement system—there are more than 17,000 separate police departments in the United States—is both a strength and a weakness. It is a great strength because the police are better attuned to their local communities and are directly accountable to their concerns. But it is also a terrible weakness in the post–September 11 world, where information sharing is key, and the sheer number of agencies often inhibits information sharing.

Fusion centers – state and regional intelligence centers that pool information from multiple jurisdictions – are the primary platforms for improving law enforcement’s intelligence-sharing capabilities. In recognition of the importance of fusion centers, President Bush highlighted the work being done in these facilities during a recent speech in which he also called America’s 800,000 state and local police “the front line in defeating terror.”

Federal agencies are not built to be the eyes and ears of local communities; local law enforcement—with the right training and support—can be. Yet there is still much work to be done in order to fully enlist state and local law enforcement in the war on terror. As Los Angeles police chief William Bratton and Manhattan Institute senior fellow George Kelling wrote last year in a Manhattan Institute Civic Report titled “Policing Terrorism”:

Americans accustomed to television shows such as 24 and CSI think that law enforcement has all sorts of intelligence information at its fingertips. This could not be further from the truth. The unfortunate reality is that law enforcement—federal, state, and local—is very far behind the private sector in terms of the ability to use technology to gather, analyze, and disseminate information.… When you rent a car today at many airports, an attendant will come out with a handheld device that enables him to gather all the information he needs on you and the car, send it wirelessly to a main database, and bill your credit card, all within a matter of few seconds. Just imagine what might have happened if the Maryland state trooper who had stopped 9/11 hijacker Ziad S. Jarrah for speeding on September 9, 2001, had had access to that type of technology and had discovered that Jarrah was on the CIA’s terrorist watch list.

The 9/11 murderers exploited law enforcement’s inability to harness the information systems that are commonly available today. Fusion centers are central to erasing that deficiency. If properly operated, fusion centers will enable law enforcement to harness information and intelligence to better identify, assess, and manage emerging threats to public safety.

via Policing Terrorism Report 2 | State Fusion Center Processes and Procedures.

February 25, 2009

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

CONTACT: (202) 675-2312; media@dcaclu.org

WASHINGTON – A Texas fusion center's “Prevention Awareness Bulletin” made public last night is the latest example of inappropriate police intelligence operations targeting political, religious and social activists for investigation. The North Central Texas Fusion System bulletin states that it is “imperative for law enforcement officers to report” the activities of lobbying groups, Muslim civil rights organizations and anti-war protest groups in their areas.

“This memo is not a plea for legitimate intelligence, and seems to endorse discrimination against Muslims,” said Caroline Fredrickson, Director of the ACLU Washington Legislative Office. “The idea that the tolerance advocated by the groups being targeted would be treated as a menace to American security demonstrates a disregard for civil liberties and a disdain for democracy itself. The kind of indiscriminate and unlawful investigations this bulletin calls for always results in a chilling effect on free speech and association.”

The federal government has facilitated the growth of a network of fusion centers since 9/11 to expand information collection and sharing practices among law enforcement agencies, the private sector and the intelligence community. There are currently 70 fusion centers in the United States.

“It should be obvious with the constant news of increased violence in Mexico that Texas needs law enforcement to focus on real criminal threats instead of targeting religious minorities and groups with unpopular political opinions.” Rebecca Bernhardt, ACLU TX Policy Director said, “The North Central Texas Fusion Center should be reviewed to determine whether it can contribute to the serious public safety mission of Texas or not.”

Proponents have claimed all fusion center personnel receive civil rights training, and that this training is sufficient to protect the privacy and civil liberties of Americans living in the communities where fusion centers operate, but this is obviously not the case. The ACLU has long warned that ambiguities regarding who controls these fusion centers and a complete lack of oversight over their intelligence activities would lead to violations like this.

“The Texas fusion center's bulletin shows an unhealthy disregard for constitutional rights and democratic processes,” said Michael German, ACLU National Security Policy Counsel and former FBI Agent. “It demonstrates the lack of professionalism that exists at fusion centers and the severe lack of oversight at the state, local and federal levels. According to its website, North Central Texas Fusion System bulletins are disseminated to thousands of people in over a hundred different agencies, and this report directs law enforcement officers to ‘report' on the political activities of advocacy groups. The web of connections it weaves – drawing parallels between Muslim civil liberties groups, lobbying organizations, peace activists, hip hop bands, a former congresswoman and even the U.S. Treasury Department – would be comical if not for the real consequences that these organizations and individuals might face.”

In 2007, the ACLU released a report entitled, “What's Wrong With Fusion Centers?” which was updated last year. The report identifies specific concerns with fusion centers, including their ambiguous lines of authority, the troubling role of private corporations, the participation of the military, the use of data mining and the excessive secrecy surrounding the centers As a national trend continues to close down public information about this domestic intelligence network, it continues to grow out of control.Recent revelations of the Department of Homeland Security's role in the Maryland State Police Department's surveillance of peace groups have deepened the ACLU's concerns, particularly because a DHS intelligence analyst is reportedly assigned to the North Central Texas Fusion System.

To read the ACLU's report on fusion centers, go to:

www.aclu.org/fusion

via Fusion Center Encourages Improper Investigations Of Lobbying Groups And Anti-War Activists | American Civil Liberties Union.